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effects  of selective  exposure  to information  regarding  climate  change  in  Germany.  The  individual  media
diets  were  derived  from  online  diaries  and  content  analyses.  The  ﬁndings  show  no  support  for  the spiral
of  silence  theory.  Individuals  who  see  themselves  in the minority  were  even  more  likely to  express  their
opinions.
© 2015  Swiss  Association  of Communication  and  Media  Research.  Published  by Elsevier  GmbH.  This
is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).. Introduction
The dissemination of online media has changed how people
btain information on current events. One dimension of change
nvolves the increased amount of content on offer. Traditional jour-
alism used to be the only source of information accessible for a
arge audience, but new sources have emerged, as anyone can now
rovide information with unlimited reach. User-generated content
UGC) in blogs or on social network sites (SNS), as well as content
ontributed by political parties, nongovernmental organizations,
ocial institutions, and companies, complements the mass media
ontent in online media outlets and in legacy media such as print
nd electronic media. The quantitative expansion of content also
elates to an increase in opinion diversity, since every additional
ser-generated item may  present a unique perspective not yet
ddressed by the mass media (Dylko & McCluskey, 2012; Gerhards
 Schäfer, 2010). The changes in media content go hand in hand
ith changes in media exposure. The abundance and diversity of
nline communication facilitate selective exposure: little effort is
equired to select media content in accordance with one’s personal
pinions (Garrett, 2009). The more easily people can put together
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el.: +49 211 8110402.
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scoms.2015.03.002
424-4896/© 2015 Swiss Association of Communication and Media Research. Published
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).distinct media diets in this manner, the more likely they are to lose
touch with the issues, perspectives, and opinions being discussed
by society at large.
This forms the starting point of our study. It is assumed that
exposure to UGC results in different perceptions of the opinion cli-
mate and further results in different communicative behavior in
public discourse than exposure to mass media. The causal rela-
tion between exposure to particular media content and opinion
expression in public is the theoretical backbone of the spiral of
silence concept put forward by Noelle-Neumann (1974) in her
theory of public opinion. According to the spiral of silence, the
perception of the opinion climate links cause and effect, thus guid-
ing people’s communicative behavior. Hence, the opinion climate
or, more precisely, perception of the opinion climate, represents
the key concept in research on the spiral of silence. We  deliber-
ately use opinion climate rather than public opinion because we
distinguish between the aggregate of individual opinions in terms
of majority and minority opinions and the normative concept of
public opinion, which represents the theoretical reference point in
research on the spiral of silence. Public opinion is a very complex
and highly contested concept. It is crucial for all analyses contex-
tualizing individual opinion formation in a society or relating it
to collective phenomena (Habermas, 2006; Herbst, 1993). Noelle-
Neumann (1974, p. 44) deﬁnes public opinion as an opinion one can
express in public without fear of social isolation. This notion clearly
addresses the normative dimension of what other people think.
It does not necessarily reﬂect the perception of the aggregate of
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ndividual opinions in terms of majority or minority. In contrast to
he normative concept of public opinion, “climate of opinion” rep-
esents the more matter-of-fact term for what other people think.
t is used widely (e.g., Scheufele & Moy, 2000), especially in empir-
cal studies on the effects of the perceived distribution of opinions
n a society on willingness to speak out.
From the perspective of the spiral of silence theory, the percep-
ion of the opinion climate is likely to inhibit people’s willingness
o speak out in public (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) if an individual’s
pinion contradicts his or her perception of the opinion climate.
ur study investigates the role of the media, in particular, the
ole of UGC in this process by ﬁrst asking how exposure to either
ass media or UGC affects the perception of the opinion climate.
econd, it investigates whether exposure to UGC or the fact that
eople hold minority opinions affect willingness to speak out in
ublic. Third, it examines the effects of speciﬁc online conditions
uch as anonymity and low-threshold evaluations as modes for
pinion expression. The research questions were addressed in an
mpirical study of the debate on climate change in Germany. It is
mportant to note that Germany stands out by the large share of
ts population that assigns relevance to climate change and that
oes not doubt its anthropogenic origin (Engels, Hüther, Schäfer, &
eld, 2013). However, there is considerable variance in the German
ebate on climate change: media outlets as well as individuals in
he audience have different perspectives on the issue; they high-
ight different aspects and hold different opinions regarding the
ossible solutions. Since climate change is framed in different ways,
e assumed that the debate provides sufﬁcient conﬂict to make it
 case for testing the spiral of silence theory under online condi-
ions.
. Applying the spiral of silence to the online world
The spiral of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1974, 1993) pro-
oses that individuals fear social isolation and only therefore speak
ut in public if they perceive themselves to be in the present or
uture majority on an issue. In order to assess the climate of opin-
on, people closely monitor their social environment via the mass
edia. The effect of mass media content on people’s perception
f the opinion climate represents the ﬁrst part of the spiral of
ilence theory, while the assumption that climate of opinion per-
eption affects willingness to speak out forms the second part of
he theory. Because the opinion perceived as a majority opinion
s expressed in public and the opinion perceived as a minority
pinion is not expressed in public, a spiraling process is initi-
ted in which the alleged majority opinion gains ground and the
lleged minority opinion loses ground. Thus, the factual opin-
on climate can eventually be reversed, which means that at the
nd of the process, the former factual minority opinion can be
xpressed in public without fear of isolation because media tend to
resent this opinion as majority opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).
he spiral of silence mechanism explains how micro-level indi-
idual behavior, such as speaking out in public under particular
onditions, might spill over to the macro-level of public opinion
ormation.
Because of its political sensitivity and the ample plausibility
f its assumptions, the spiral of silence theory has sparked many
ollow-up studies across the world. The results varied with the
ultural context, the operationalization, and the issue under inves-
igation. In the overall picture, evidence supporting spiral of silence
ssumptions is rather weak. A meta-analysis by Glynn, Hayes, and
hanahan (1997) showed a signiﬁcant average correlation of r = .05
etween opinion congruence (between own opinion and climate of
pinion) and willingness to speak out in 17 relevant studies. Fur-
her, there is evidence for alternative explanations: the silencingnication Sciences 15 (2015) 143–150
effect can also be explained by the pluralistic ignorance approach,
projection effects such as the looking glass effect, or the effect
of peer group opinions (Fields & Schuman, 1976; Glynn & Park,
1997; Oshagan, 1996; Taylor, 1982). Some of the limited effects
were attributed to violations of the conditions speciﬁed by Noelle-
Neumann such as moral loading of an issue, the dynamic of the
opinion climate for that issue, and the disregard of the time com-
ponent (Bodor, 2012; Matthes, 2014; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). The
difference in the operationalization of the key concepts was another
reason frequently brought up to explain why  it was hard to ﬁnd
consistent effects. Another explanation for the lack of sound evi-
dence cited the doubts that individuals are actually able to gauge
the opinion climate (Bodor, 2012). If people cannot gauge the opin-
ion climate, they cannot estimate the degree of dissonance between
their personal opinion and the perceived opinion climate. Conse-
quently, the estimate cannot inhibit people’s opinion expression in
public.
While most studies in spiral of silence research have dealt with
the degree of reluctance to speak out in public, since this was con-
sidered to represent the key effect in the theoretical framework,
only a few scholars have focused on the preceding perception of the
opinion climate (Dalisay, 2012; Kim, Han, Shanahan, & Berdayes,
2004). This is particularly noteworthy because fear of isolation and
monitoring the climate of opinion via the media represent essential
concepts of this media effects theory and may  be regarded as the
premise for any effect on speaking out in public. Hence, the deter-
minants of the perception of the opinion climate deserve special
attention. Noelle-Neumann had speciﬁed consonance in the mass
media as a condition for a spiral of silence to develop. This seemed
reasonable, because only a unanimous media environment can be
expected to shape people’s perceptions of the present or future
dominance of a particular opinion.
Despite weak empirical support for the spiral of silence the-
ory, its fundamental ideas remain compelling. The assumptions
of the spiral of silence theory are a sound theoretical basis to
further investigate the effects of media exposure on perception
and discourse behavior (Schulz & Roessler, 2012). Serving as an
important source of information, mass media content inﬂuences
what individuals perceive as majority or minority opinion and
affects whether they adapt their discursive behavior accordingly.
Since the media environment has undergone a fundamental expan-
sion through online communication, this paper asks whether
different types of media use result in different perceptions and
discourse-related effects. It aims to investigate the impact of online
communication on the effects spelled out in the spiral of silence
theory.
With the advent of online communication, media content pre-
viously used for monitoring the climate of opinion has changed
considerably. The mass media have been complemented by online
content contributed by users. In contrast to professional journalism,
UGC comprises unﬁltered individual opinions (Dylko & McCluskey,
2012; Wall, 2005), because it need not comply with common jour-
nalistic norms, for example, objectivity (see Schudson, 2001). We
may  assume a multitude of opinions also, because of the vast
number of websites maintained by different organizations, e.g.,
social movements, which are particularly prone to experimenta-
tion (Della Porta & Mosca, 2009). Further, online content beyond
the news sites of mass media, such as blogs or SNS, is unlikely
to follow the mass media logic or reﬂect the corresponding rou-
tines of news selection. Rather, it can be assumed to follow the
subjective and highly diverse individual preferences of its produc-
ers.The unavoidable counterpart of the increase in information is
therefore an increase in audience selectivity. Facing an abundance
of new channels and an unmatched diversity of opinions, indi-
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hoose to expose themselves only to sources in line with their per-
onal opinions or choose to gather information from a plurality
f sources (Schulz & Roessler, 2012). Since it can be assumed that
eople act according to the classic selective exposure pattern and
refer information supporting their own opinions, they are likely
o encounter a fairly consonant set of opinions in their individual
edia diets (Cotton, 1985; Garrett, 2009; Stroud, 2008). Exposure
o UGC may  therefore offer a chance for individuals to expose them-
elves to consonant contents and avoid messages not in line with
heir opinion. In short, selective exposure—enabled through the
xpansion of sources—can counteract the increase in diversity on
he individual level. Thus, in an adaptation of the spiral of silence
esearch for the online world, consonance would persist on the
ndividual level even under conditions of otherwise diverse media
ontent online. If we want to assess the role of online media in
eneral and, particularly, the role of consonance in shaping the per-
eption of the climate of opinion, we have to relate individual media
xposure to individual perceptions of the climate of opinion.
Another relevant change in the media environment to consider
hen transferring the spiral of silence to the online world concerns
he options for opinion expression. Rather than speaking out in
ublic under their real names and risking social consequences in
ase of unpopular opinions, individuals may  express their opinions
nonymously. They may  “like” or share a piece of content or express
upport for an opinion in a similar way, which does not imply much
ffort and commitment. Posting short comments might also be an
ption, with a low level of threshold, which clearly differs from the
ace-to-face situation usually evoked in research on the spiral of
ilence. Public discourse under online conditions not only refers to
edia exposure, it also includes the way individuals speak out in
ublic.
. The spiral of silence online as a subject of empirical
esearch
As it became obvious that mediated communication has funda-
entally changed through the Internet, scholars started discussing
he validity of classic media effects approaches under online condi-
ions. The spiral of silence theory was tested early, with willingness
o speak out as the focus of empirical research. The few studies
n the perception of the opinion climate touched on divergent
spects, hardly suited to add up to a coherent picture. Tsfati,
troud, and Chotiner’s (2014) survey showed that exposure to
ight-wing online media had an impact on the perception of its
sers, as they saw a low level of support for the withdrawal of
he Israelian Defense Forces from the Gaza Strip. However, the
ooking-glass effect proved to be even stronger: people’s per-
onal opinions shaped this perception. The more people supported
he disengagement strategy, the more they saw a high level of
ublic support for disengagement. Wojcieszak (2008) found evi-
ence for a similar projection effect. Her survey data showed that
adical users of both Nazi and environmentalist online discus-
ion forums overestimated public support for their views. Even
hough evidence is still weak, Tsfati et al.’s (2014) study suggests
hat online exposure might affect the perception of the opin-
on climate and might skew the perception shaped by the less
ubjective mass media. We  therefore derived the following hypoth-
sis:
1. Exposure to mass media and to UGC leads to different per-
eptions of the opinion climate.
Following the former research focus on willingness to speak out
n the ofﬂine world, a rich line of research on opinion expression
nline has emerged. The results, of mainly experimental inquiries,
ave been mixed. Some studies on the spiral of silence online
ould not ﬁnd evidence for the classic assumptions. Experimentsnication Sciences 15 (2015) 143–150 145
by McDevitt, Kiousis, and Wahl-Jorgensen (2003) showed that
the degree of dissonance between the participant’s opinions and
perceived public opinion did not affect opinion expression on the
abortion issue. Mayer-Uellner (2003) also found that holding opin-
ions contrary to the perceived opinions in online discussion forums
had no silencing effect. He analyzed discussions on different politi-
cal issues and found that opinion dissonance even fostered opinion
expression in public. Other studies revealed mixed results, mainly
contradicting an effect of perceiving a dissonant opinion climate
on opinion expression under varying online conditions. This is true
for the online experiment by Ho and McLeod (2008), who found
no evidence to support a spiral of silence under online conditions
or under face-to-face conditions. In contrast, Liu and Fahmy (2011)
found evidence for silencing effects in face-to-face settings, but not
in online settings. Kwon, Moon, and Stefanone (2014) did not ﬁnd
an effect in the online setting as well: Facebook users’ willingness to
self-censor could not be explained by dissonance with other users’
opinions.
Some other studies did ﬁnd support for a spiral of silence online,
showing that dissonance between personal opinion and a perceived
general opinion climate ofﬂine (Gearhart & Zhang, 2013; Kim, Kim,
& Oh, 2014) or online (Hampton et al., 2014; Nekmat & Gonzenbach,
2013) inhibits opinion expression in public.
The contradictory ﬁndings on the spiral of silence online
strongly resemble the literature on the spiral of silence in mass
media environments (see the meta-analysis by Glynn et al., 1997).
The mixed ﬁndings, however, also point to well-known limitations
of the study designs. This includes a disregard of public opinion
dynamics, the question of time, and a lack of coherent operational-
ization. It remains unclear whether speaking out in online forums
is inhibited by conﬂicts between personal opinion and perceived
opinion climate. With the conﬂicting evidence in mind, further
inquiry is necessary to clarify the validity of spiral of silence’s
assumptions in the online world. Thus, for the purpose of this paper,
we test the classic hypothesis:
H2. Dissonance between an individual’s personal opinion and his
or her perceived opinion climate discourages willingness to speak
out.
Comparatively few studies on the spiral of silence theory online
have aimed at explaining a person’s willingness to speak out not
only through the degree of dissonance, but also through exposure
to either mass media or UGC. Ho and McLeod (2008) showed that
exposure to print media did not inhibit speaking out in public. How-
ever, their analysis left unclear whether this effect occurs under
online conditions only. The effect of exposure to UGC on opin-
ion expression, particularly on Facebook or Twitter, is contested:
Gearhart and Zhang (2013) found evidence for a positive effect,
whereas Hampton et al. (2014) and Kwon et al. (2014) detected a
negative effect of exposure to UGC on speaking out. This means that,
under certain conditions, using UGC can both catalyze and inhibit
opinion expression. Given the contradictory ﬁndings, we assume
the following undirected relationship:
H3. Exposure to UGC affects willingness to speak out. More specif-
ically, exposure to UGC may  either increase or decrease opinion
expression in public.
Individual opinion expression is likely to be facilitated under
conditions of anonymity (Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimmons, 2002;
Joinson, 2001), especially when one’s personal opinion conﬂicts
with the perceived climate of opinion. However, willingness to
speak out does not seem to be clearly boosted by anonymous
online conditions (Mayer-Uellner, 2003; Yun & Park, 2011). At the
same time, the online world offers occasions for effortless opin-
ion expression. Facebook’s “like” button may  serve as an example
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ssume that opinion expression is facilitated under conditions of
nonymity, low threshold, and low commitment. We  proposed the
ollowing hypothesis:
4. Willingness to speak out is highest under anonymous or low-
hreshold “like-button” conditions, and is lowest under face-to-face
onditions.
The hypotheses stated above are derived from the application of
he spiral of silence theory to the online world and from a review of
revious research on online spirals. They were tested in an empiri-
al study of the German debate about climate change. Our literature
eview had revealed three weaknesses in the line of research on the
piral of silence online that were addressed in the study. First, very
ittle attention was directed at the content dimension of the media
hat were used for monitoring the environment. Without content
nalyses, we have little knowledge about the differences between
ass media content on an issue and UGC, which means that the
esults of individual media exposure are not sufﬁciently clear. The
ame is true for the perception that develops as a result of exposure,
hich marks a second weakness: analyses of the effect of individual
edia exposure on the perception of the opinion are rare excep-
ions. If different content patterns can be assumed between mass
edia and UGC, it is crucial to investigate what types of content
ere attended to, how this content relates to people’s personal
pinions, and how this affects individual willingness to speak out.
elating the media items that individuals exposed themselves to
ith their perceptions is certainly a step toward a deeper under-
tanding of the role of media in discursive behavior, as suggested
y the spiral of silence’s framework. Third, experiments dominate
ver survey research in real-life settings. Further ﬁeld studies are
eeded to obtain a more valid picture of perceptions and behaviors
n such settings.
Our study aimed to overcome some of these shortcomings. It
et out to examine how individual media diets—representing the
esult of selective exposure—affect the perception of the climate
f opinion and willingness to speak out. Our study translated “dif-
erent media contacts into a comprehensive pattern of exposure”
Hasebrink & Popp, 2006, p. 369), and was thus sensitive to media
se across channels and platforms.
. Issue context and conceptual consequences
This paper focuses on spiral of silence processes regarding
ublic discourse on the climate change issue. Numerous stud-
es have indicated a severe rise in temperature and sea levels as
 result of human carbon dioxide emissions (see, e.g., Solomon,
lattner, Knutti, & Friedlingstein, 2009). The climate change issue is
herefore highly relevant, demands political and societal solutions,
nd receives global media attention (Schmidt, Ivanova, & Schäfer,
013). Anthropogenic climate change is a widely accepted fact in
ermany (Engels et al., 2013). Thus, the operationalization of opin-
ons regarding the climate change issue required an instrument that
aught the subtle differences of cognitions and attitudes among
uite consensual opinions.
The framing approach was particularly suitable in this respect,
s it allowed for a multidimensional operationalization that reﬂects
elective attention to individual perspectives on climate change.
rames capture how the media highlight or neglect certain problem
eﬁnitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations, and treat-
ent recommendations regarding certain issues (Entman, 1993, p.
2). The framing approach can also be applied to individual cog-
itions and opinions on issues (Scheufele, 1999). Regarding the
rucial concept of public opinion perception or the perception of
he climate of opinion, frames in public communication can be
onsidered as the underlying structure of public opinion (Eilders,
004). Different patterns of media exposure imply that differentnication Sciences 15 (2015) 143–150
patterns of frames are encountered by the respective media users.
Thus, users with different media preferences can be assumed to




The research question and the hypotheses involved two depend-
ent variables. In line with the spiral of silence theory’s causal chain,
two consecutive models of explanations are required with two  sep-
arate dependent variables. First, in model I, climate change-related
media exposure was  assumed to affect perceived opinion climate
on the issue (H1). In model II, the relationship between the individ-
uals’ opinions on the issue and the perceived opinion climate (H2)
as well as the exposure to UGC (H3) were hypothesized to affect
willingness to speak out.
5.2. Data collection
We  conducted an online diary study on media exposure
regarding the debate on climate change in Germany. Participants
were recruited several days before the Rio+20 United Nations Con-
ference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in 2012,
where political actors met  to discuss such issues as a green econ-
omy, sustainability, and climate change. Like other international
conferences (Schäfer, Ivanova, & Schmidt, 2013), the Rio+20 confer-
ence was expected to trigger a considerable level of media coverage.
We were conﬁdent in ﬁnding sufﬁcient issue-related media content
in the individual media repertoires of the respondents.
We recruited participants via screening in ecological Facebook
groups and blogs and from a commercial online-access panel.
Prospective participants were sampled based on three quota crite-
ria: individuals aged between 18 and 50, who  reported being at
least moderately interested in politics, and who  used mass media
or UGC on a routine basis. Our restriction to this age range allowed
for more valid comparisons between the mass media users and the
UGC users. The other two quota criteria served the purpose of pri-
marily collecting data from individuals susceptible to media use
about the climate change issue. Further, the quota criteria counter-
act some undesirable biases of participant characteristics caused by
self-selected online samples. By screening participants in UGC and
an online access panel, we  aimed to recruit individuals who used
different types of media.
Respondents were invited to take part in an online diary study
for 7 days during the Rio+20 conference. The diary, which was pre-
viously tested with undergraduate social science students, mapped
the respondents’ climate change-related exposure to mass media
and UGC. Exposure to well-known television news programs, daily
newspapers, and news magazines was assessed using closed ques-
tions. Because of the greater diversity of online items, exposure
to UGC was assessed using open-ended questions. Participants
were asked to ﬁll in the URLs or the names of the websites with
climate change-related content that they had visited on a given
day. The diary study aims to overcome possible limitations of
recall-based news exposure measures using surveys, given that
Prior (2009) showed that individuals overestimate their media
exposure in self-reports. Diaries limit the degree of misjudg-
ments by explicitly requesting the day-by-day media use. Our
approach did not bias the participants’ daily routines (e.g., as via
media-use tracking) and allowed us to measure valid media reper-
toires.
After reporting their media use in the diaries for 7 days, the par-
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egarding their perception of the climate of opinion on the climate
hange issue, their opinions on the issue, their willingness to speak
ut, and other relevant individual characteristics. All individuals
ho had kept the online diary for 7 days and who  had taken the
nline survey were included in the data analysis (n = 444). Our
esign led to dropouts, especially during the diary period, since
t required participants to invest a substantial amount of time. We
ad to accept this limitation in order to get an unprecedented in-
epth account of individuals’ media use. In view of this limitation,
e rewarded participants with the chance to win one of 10 Amazon
indle e-readers if they completed the online diaries and the two
ther questionnaires as requested.
.3. Measures
.3.1. Models I and II: individual media use preference as
ndependent variable
By applying a quantitative content analysis, we  categorized
he type of media through which the individual respondents had
ncountered media items (n = 1163) on climate change as either
ass media or UGC. Intercoder reliability was assessed using
olsti’s (1969) coefﬁcient. The intercoder reliability for the media
ype variable based on a sample of 20 media items was  .98. Mass
edia consisted of newspapers, news magazines, television broad-
asts, and online versions of the respective mass media (68% of all
edia items). UGC consisted of blogs, SNS, and miscellaneous web-
ites (32% of all media items). Respondents were then divided into
wo groups, according to their preferences for either mass media or
GC regarding climate change. The individual media use preference
onsisted of the respective balance when subtracting mass media
tems from the number of respective UGC items in the individual
edia repertoires. A positive balance indicated a predominant use
f UGC or a preference for UGC (12% of the participants) and a
egative balance indicated a predominant use of mass media or
 preference for mass media (60% of the participants; M = −3.38,
D = 5.17). Participants without climate change-related media use
25%), or without a clear preference for a speciﬁc type of media
3%), were not considered in the analysis. Individual media use
reference was used for testing H1 and H3.
.3.2. Model I: perception of the opinion climate as dependent
ariable
To test the ﬁrst component of the theory, we  conceptualized
he perception of the opinion climate as a dependent variable. The
raming approach was adopted in order to reduce the complexity
f the plurality of perceived opinions on climate change. Individ-
al emphases of climate change perspectives were grouped into
arger units marking common perspectives in the sample. These
erspectives on climate change shared by several respondents
ere statistically derived from survey answers of 444 participants
egarding different aspects of the climate change issue via clus-
er analysis. The individual aspects of climate change that the
espondents had reported in the survey were considered frame ele-
ents, which were grouped into larger homogeneous units based
n their similarities. These units consisted of respondents sharing
imilar perceptions of the opinion climate and were considered
rame clusters of individuals. This statistical approach to the iden-
iﬁcation of frames was ﬁrst introduced by Matthes and Kohring
2008). As opposed to identifying frames from mere theoretical
onsiderations, it allows for the reliable and objective identiﬁca-
ion of frames in any body of text and can also be applied to survey
nswers.Perception of the opinion climate was operationalized using 10
rame-element variables. Respondents were asked: “What do you
hink most Germans think about . . .?” regarding the causes and con-
equences of climate change, the responsibility for the solution,nication Sciences 15 (2015) 143–150 147
the solvability of the problem, the political and nonpolitical subis-
sues of climate change, and the societal sectors affected by climate
change. In order to obtain consistent levels of measurement for
the variables entered into cluster analysis, the 10 mostly nom-
inally scaled frame elements were transformed into 45 dummy
variables, which were then used as cluster variables in a hier-
archical cluster analysis with SPSS software. Individuals showing
the lowest squared Euclidean distances (differences) between their
opinion climate perceptions were clustered together. We applied
the Ward agglomeration method, as it is supposed to derive the
most coherent clusters of cases that differ most from other clus-
ters (Breckenridge, 2000). Using the elbow criterion to determine
the appropriate amount of coherent clusters, we identiﬁed three
frames in our sample: Almost half of the participants (45%) believed
that most Germans viewed climate change as a global problem of
environmental politics.  This frame included aspects that emphasized
the global scope of climate change and the political environment-
related objectives, rather than economic or ecological dimensions.
Further, according to this frame, climate change represents a prob-
lem that is relevant to anyone, in any part of the world. Almost a
third of the respondents (31%) believed that most Germans con-
sider climate change an urgent political problem. This frame implies
that other people were perceived as alarmed by an approaching
climate catastrophe. Although the political sphere was viewed as
being responsible for solving the climate problem, there was  no
consensus on a strictly political perspective on the issue. A quar-
ter of the participants (25%) believed that most people thought of
climate change as a solvable political problem. This frame was  char-
acterized by a low degree of awareness of the multiple and serious
consequences of climate change. In contrast to the other frames, cli-
mate change was  considered a manageable problem. These frames
identiﬁed in the cluster analysis served as the dependent variable
in H1.
5.3.3. Model II: opinion dissonance as independent variable
Regarding the second step of the theory, we introduced the
dissonance between people’s personal opinions and perceived opin-
ion climate as the central predictor of willingness to speak out.
Perceived opinion climate was measured as described above (see
Section 5.3.2). Individuals’ opinions were measured using the same
set of answers to the question regarding perceived opinion climate.
They were asked for their opinions on the climate change issue:
“What do you think about . . .?” The degree of dissonance was  cal-
culated as the sum of absolute differences between people’s own
opinions and the individual’s perceptions of the opinion climate.
Again, 45 dummy variables were constructed (M = 10.34, SD = 4.63).
The dissonance measure served as an independent variable in H2.
5.3.4. Model II: willingness to speak out as dependent variable
Willingness to speak out indicates an individual’s likelihood of
expressing an opinion that deviates from his or her perceived opin-
ion climate. We  asked the respondent to indicate the likelihood of
expressing his or her opinion to unknown individuals (a) in a bar,
(b) in a blog when his or her real name was required, (c) in a blog
with only a nickname required, and (d) via a “like” button on an
SNS. Answers ranged from 0 (very unlikely) to 4 (very likely), and
results were as follows: in the bar setting, M = 1.96, SD = 1.22; in
the blog setting with real name, M = 2.04, SD = 1.24; in the anony-
mous blog setting, M = 2.35, SD = 1.25; in the “like”-button setting:
M = 2.61, SD = 1.41.
5.3.5. Models I and II: control variables
Since spiral of silence research mostly considers a set of relevant
individual characteristics as additional explanations (e.g., Kim et al.,
2014; Neuwirth, 2000; Shamir, 1997), we  included the following
control variables in both models: interest in politics (M = 3.78,
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Table  1




setting (n = 309)
Anonymous blog
setting (n = 313)
Like-button setting
(n = 310)
ˇ  (SE)  ˇ (SE)  ˇ (SE)  ˇ (SE)
Block 1: control variables
Age .07 (.01) .05 (.01) −.04 (.01) .05 (.01)
Education .02 (.05) −.02 (.05) −.04 (.06) .08 (.06)
Sex  −.01 (.14) .04 (.14) −.00 (.15) .03 (.17)
Interpersonal comm. face-to-face .20 (.06)*** −.01 (.06) .08 (.06) .08 (.07)
Interpersonal comm.  online .16 (.07)* .28 (.07)*** .17 (.07)** .09 (.08)
Interest in politics .14 (.08)* .13 (.08)* .08 (.08) .01 (.09)
Importance of CC issue .10 (.07) .14 (.08)* .18 (.08)** .10 (.09)
R2 (%) 16.5 15.3 11.5 6.6
Block  2: focal predictors
Dissonance between personal
opinion and the opinion climate
.04 (.02) .14 (.02)* .10 (.02) .23 (.02)***
Preference for UGC use −.01 (.21) .02 (.21) .05 (.21) .02 (.24)
Dissonance × preference for UGC
use
−.01 (.00) .04 (.00) .12 (.00) .19 (.00)**
Incremental R2 (%) 0.1 1.6 2.5 6.4
Total  R2 (%) 16.6 16.9 14.0 13.0





































** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
D = 0.90), ranging from 2 (somewhat interested) to 5 (very inter-
sted) and importance of climate change issue (M = 3.14, SD = 0.90),
anging from 0 (very unimportant) to 4 (very important). In order
o identify social factors inﬂuencing the effects under scrutiny,
espondents were asked about their climate change-related inter-
ersonal communication face-to-face (M = 0.93, SD = 0.92) and online
M = 0.38, SD = 0.69). These variables ranged from 0 (not interested
n/no occasion for discussion) to 3 (comprehensive discussion).
ge (18–29 years = 34%, 30–39 years = 31%, 40–50 years = 36%,
 = 35.03; SD = 9.02), education (M = 3.70, SD = 1.30) ranging from
 (secondary general school) to 5 (university degree), and gender
females 57%, males 43%) were also considered. For model I, the
ndividual’s opinion was inserted as a further control variable and
perationalized as personal opinion frame clusters. Four personal
pinion frame clusters on climate change were calculated follow-
ng the same procedure applied to the frame identiﬁcation in the
erceived opinion climate: global economic responsibility (42% of
articipants), global political problem (30% of participants), climate
essimism (15% of participants), and moderate problem awareness
12% of participants).
. Results
Owing to the categorical character of the dependent variable
f the ﬁrst model, effects on perception of the opinion climate were
nalyzed by applying logistic regression models1 with dummy  vari-
bles for each of the three frames. The ﬁndings show that all of
he perceptions of the opinion climate (climate change as a global
roblem of environmental politics, urgent political problem, or solv-
ble political problem) were independent of the type of preferred
nformation on climate change (no table). Exposure to either mass
edia or UGC did not affect the perception of the opinion climate.
his means that H1 was not supported. Further, no looking-glass
ffects were found. Contrary to previous ﬁndings (Tsfati et al.,
1 Logistic regressions (n = 313) resulted in the following explained variances:
1)  model with DV global problem of environmental politics, R2
Nagelkerke
= 7.5%; (2)
odel with DV solvable political problem, R2
Nagelkerke
= 7.0%; (3) model with DV urgent
olitical problem, R2
Nagelkerke
= 2.6%. Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients (B) were
eported.2014), people’s own opinions did not affect their perceptions of
the opinion climate. However, several other predictors affected the
perception of the opinion climate. Talking to others face-to-face
about the climate change issue decreased the likelihood that people
thought most others would consider climate change a solvable
political problem (B = −.24, p < .05). If people thought the climate
change issue was  important (B = .36, p < .05), the chances that peo-
ple thought most others would consider climate change a solvable
political problem increased. While interpersonal communication
seems to inhibit the perception of a rather optimistic opinion
climate, assigning importance has the opposite effect. Assigning
importance to the climate change issue also had a negative effect
on the perception that most people see climate change as a global
problem of environmental politics. Individuals who assessed climate
change as important were less likely to see other people placing
particular emphasis on the global dimension of the problem and
linking the issue to environmental politics (B = –.36, p < .05). This
ﬁnding seems odd at ﬁrst sight, but there is a possible explana-
tion for it: individuals engaged in climate change problems may
be falsely convinced of the uniqueness of their problem awareness
and may  deny that others could see the problem in a very similar
way (Chambers, 2008).
In order to test the effect of opinion dissonance and media
exposure patterns on willingness to speak out in four hypo-
thetical settings, we applied ordinary least-squares regression
models (Table 1). Dissonance between individuals’ own opinion
and perceived climate of opinion did not show the expected nega-
tive effect on willingness to speak out. Contrary to our assumptions,
dissonance even increased willingness to speak out under certain
conditions. This was  related to two online settings (blog with real
name:  ˇ = .14, p < .05; “like”-button:  ˇ = .23, p < .001). Therefore, H2
is not supported. This ﬁnding ties in with the ambivalent evidence
on the effects on online opinion expressions, which is in accordance
with some previous studies (e.g., Liu & Fahmy, 2011; McDevitt et al.,
2003), but contradicts others (e.g., Gearhart & Zhang, 2013; Nekmat
& Gonzenbach, 2013).
Preference for mass media or UGC showed no effect on
either the perceived opinion climate or willingness to speak out.
The interaction of preference for UGC use with opinion disso-
nance only increased the willingness to speak out regarding the
“like”-button setting (  ˇ = .19, p < .01). This effect may  be explained
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Table  2
Willingness to speak out across types of media use preferences.
Preference for mass media use Preference for UGC use All subjects
n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD)
Bar setting 256 2.05a (1.22) 53 2.08a (1.25) 427 1.96 (1.22)
Real-name blog setting 259 2.10a (1.26) 51 2.39a (1.10) 431 2.04 (1.24)
Anonymous blog setting 261 2.39a (1.25) 53 2.87b (0.96) 438 2.34 (1.22)

















































aote. Horizontal comparisons between means marked by lowercase superscripts. M
or  independent samples.
y the familiarity with low-threshold modes of opinion expres-
ion on SNS platforms. However, because of limited evidence, H3
as not supported. All the models underlined the inﬂuence of pre-
ictors known from previous studies. The ﬁndings show that the
ore people talked about climate change, the more they were
illing to speak out in public (see, e.g., Neuwirth, 2000). If people
alked about climate change face-to-face, they were more willing
o express their opinion in a bar (  ˇ = .20, p < .001), but not in online
nvironments. In contrast, if people talked about climate change
nline, they were more willing to speak out in online public spaces
han in other settings (bar,  ˇ = .16, p < .05; blog with real name,
 = .28, p < .001; anonymous blog,  ˇ = .17, p < .01). These ﬁndings
oint to the important role of familiarity with different social envi-
onments for opinion expression. When people are used to talking
ith others in face-to-face environments, they are also likely to
xpress deviating opinions in such public spaces. The same holds
rue for online environments: Individuals familiar with any sort
f online chat and discussion groups are likely to speak out online.
urther, interest in politics (bar,  ˇ = .14, p < .05; blog with real name,
 = .13, p < .05) and importance of climate change issue (blog with
eal name,  ˇ = .14, p < .05; anonymous blog,  ˇ = .18, p < .01) fostered
illingness to speak out in different types of settings. This supports
ndings from traditional spiral of silence research.
Finally, H4 predicted differences regarding willingness to speak
ut in different settings, depending on the degree of anonymity
nd the effort involved. Our data (Table 2) strongly support this
ypothesis. People were signiﬁcantly more willing to express their
pinions in anonymous (M = 2.34, SD = 1.22) and low-threshold
nline scenarios (M = 2.61, SD = 1.39) than in face-to-face conditions
M = 1.96, SD = 1.22).2 These ﬁndings were even more pronounced
or users with a preference for UGC, who showed a signiﬁcantly
igher willingness to speak out in public than users with a pref-
rence for mass media. Again, familiarity with online discourse
roves to be the accelerator of online opinion expression.
. Conclusions
The starting point of our study was a straightforward assump-
ion advocated by the spiral of silence theory: People monitor the
ocial environment via the media in order to gauge the opinion cli-
ate. In the case of conﬂict between one’s personal opinion and
he perceived opinion climate, people are unlikely to speak out in
ublic. In view of the expansion and diversiﬁcation of the media
nvironment, the spiral of silence theory required a new empirical
est. We  investigated whether the assumptions hold under online
onditions, and how exposure to UGC affects the perception of the
pinion climate and people’s willingness to speak out. Since UGC
s likely to present a picture of climate change that differs from
he picture presented in the mass media, and since users can put
ogether largely individual media diets based on these sources, we
ssumed that individuals who monitored the debate about climate
2 According to t-tests for paired samples. that do not share a letter in their superscripts differ at p < .05 according to t-tests
change through UGC formed a different picture of the opinion cli-
mate on the issue than people who  monitored the debate via mass
media coverage. In accordance with the spiral of silence theory,
we further assumed that exposure to those sources would reduce
their willingness to speak out if individuals saw themselves in the
minority position.
The ﬁndings contradicted our assumptions. Exposure to UGC
affected neither the perception of the opinion climate nor the opin-
ion expression in public, and individuals who viewed themselves
as part of the minority were even more willing to speak out in pub-
lic than those who  viewed themselves as part of the majority. The
latter ﬁnding was evident under online conditions of real-name
blog communication, and when opinion expression was reduced
to “liking” a certain position online. Possible explanations for the
lack of impact of the particular media source relate to a diffusion
of mass media content into UGC and vice versa (frame interac-
tions, see Zhou & Moy, 2007), thus leaving only marginal differences
between the picture of the climate change debate presented in
the two types of sources. The fact that dissonance between peo-
ple’s opinions and perceptions of the opinion climate did not keep
people from speaking out ties in with empirical evidence from
some previous studies, which also found no silencing effect under
online conditions. However, given the plausibility of the theoret-
ical assumptions, the results nevertheless raise the question why
we did not ﬁnd the expected effects. The lack of support for the
spiral of silence might be explained by the low degree of moral
conﬂict in the German climate change debate. Under these con-
ditions, fear of isolation is unlikely to inhibit the articulation of
a minority opinion, especially if the debate is on differences in
perspective, rather than on fundamentally diverging opinions or
values. In addition, the ﬁnding might also be due to the large num-
ber of respondents in our sample who  were interested in climate
change. They might represent the small group of individuals, the
hard core, who are always willing to speak out (Glynn & McLeod,
1984). In summary, there is still a lack of undisputed evidence for
the spiral of silence with regard to both ofﬂine and online set-
tings.
Unlike most studies on the spiral of silence under online condi-
tions, which use experimental designs and thus suffer from limited
external validity, our diary study applied a ﬁeld study design with
a real-world setting. Therefore, the study claims a high degree
of external validity. In addition, our design allows for examining
the role of individual media exposure, which is often neglected
as an explanation of perception and silencing effects. Finally, we
overcame the problems regarding the adequate media use mea-
surement (Prior, 2009) by using a diary design that limited the
time to recall media exposure to only one day during one week of
study. Our precise measurement of media use allowed the media
units in the individual media diets to be traced back. This provided
grounds for combining survey data on individual media exposure
with content analyses in a very reliable way. Future media effects
studies may  consider applying online diaries to connect differen-
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